Two screenless wearables turned biology into a dashboard. Now they want public-market money at valuations that look a lot like the last company to try this.
Oura and Whoop are racing toward IPOs at private valuations of roughly $10 billion to $11 billion, around 10 times revenue. The pitch is irresistible: sticky subscriptions, millions of loyal users, celebrity backing. The catch is that Fitbit hit a near-$10 billion market cap a decade ago, then sold to Google for about $2.1 billion.
Picture a Whoop band on LeBron James and an Oura ring on Gwyneth Paltrow. Self-optimization has become a status symbol, and two companies have turned it into recurring revenue. The question Wall Street has to answer is whether that is a durable software business or a hardware fad wearing a SaaS costume.
What Happened
Both Oura and Whoop are growing fast and angling to go public soon. Each recently raised capital at private valuations near $10 billion to $11 billion, roughly 10 times revenue. Oura has sold more than 5.5 million rings, and in the first quarter of this year it became one of the most popular wearable brands in the U.S. by unit volume, trailing only Apple and Google, according to IDC. Whoop reports more than 2.5 million members worldwide.
The appeal is genuine. These devices deliver useful insights, from menstrual-cycle prediction to granular sleep analysis, and that builds real loyalty. Both companies count heavyweight fans: Whoop has backing from LeBron James and Cristiano Ronaldo, while Oura has drawn praise from celebrities like Gwyneth Paltrow.
The Backstory
For investors, one ghost keeps walking in: Fitbit. A decade ago, the pioneering fitness-tracker maker went public and soared to a market capitalization near $10 billion, eerily close to where Oura and Whoop sit today. Then growth stalled. Single-purpose trackers got swallowed by all-in-one smartwatches like the Apple Watch. In 2021, Google scooped up Fitbit for about $2.1 billion, less than two times revenue.
That is the cautionary arc hanging over this boom. A company catches a real cultural wave, gets valued on growth instead of steady-state profit, and eventually hits a ceiling. Peloton ran the same play. Even in its best years, that premium hardware darling managed only high single-digit operating margins.
The Core Development
Oura and Whoop are not pure Fitbit clones, and that is the bull case. Instead of selling mass-market step counters, they sell premium products that turn biometrics like heart rate variability and skin temperature into actionable outputs: early illness warnings, recovery scores, training recommendations. Both lean on sticky subscription revenue, and notably, neither has a screen.
That screenless design is a real strategic wedge. It positions them as companions to an Apple Watch, or as alternatives for people who do not want one more glowing rectangle demanding attention. The hardware is effectively a key, and the subscription is the product.
The Business Model Angle
This is the classic “subsidize the device, sell the recurring service” playbook, and it is the same move that lets subscription businesses command premium valuations over one-time hardware sellers. Recurring revenue is predictable, it compounds, and Wall Street pays up for it.
But here is the lesson founders should not skip: a subscription wrapper does not automatically convert a hardware business into a software business. The economics underneath still matter. Direct-to-consumer health brands face punishingly high customer-acquisition costs, says health-tech analyst Stephanie Davis, because they have to keep spending just to replace users who burn out on tracking their own data. Oura is now running its largest marketing push ever, with ads during the NBA Finals. That spend may be necessary to keep growth alive, but it eats straight into margin. The label on the box is “subscription.” The reality can still be “low-margin consumer hardware.”
The Risk
The honest counterpoint is the growth ceiling. Smart rings are one of the few wearable categories still expanding, but the adoption curve could weaken sooner than an $11 billion valuation implies. Right now, Oura is harvesting affluent, health-conscious buyers at the top of a K-shaped economy. The hard question is what happens at saturation. Will everyday consumers, already cutting back at Target and skipping Chipotle, sign up for a recurring fee just to be reminded they should exercise more?
According to IDC, global smart-ring shipments should keep growing through 2027 but begin to plateau in the U.S. by 2028, with IDC’s Jitesh Ubrani pointing to high prices and the lack of a major functionality breakthrough. Competition is fierce, too. Oura is playing aggressive legal defense, filing patent complaints to block Samsung and Indian rival Ultrahuman. Even so, the underlying metrics these rings collect can be captured at no extra cost by cheaper devices worn elsewhere, like a wrist tracker.
Then there is the valuation gravity. Look at Garmin: profitable, effectively debt-free, growing its fitness segment at a healthy clip, and trading at five to six times revenue. That is about half what Oura and Whoop currently command. If growth slows, those multiples can compress fast. The one credible bull case beyond the hype is medicalization, wearables evolving into clinically integrated tools used by doctors and insurers. But that road is slow and heavily regulated.
Quick Questions
Why are Oura and Whoop worth $10 billion to $11 billion?
Both raised private capital at roughly 10 times revenue, driven by fast growth, sticky subscriptions, and millions of loyal users. Oura has sold more than 5.5 million rings; Whoop reports more than 2.5 million members.
What does Fitbit have to do with it?
Fitbit hit a near-$10 billion market cap a decade ago, then growth stalled as smartwatches took over. Google bought it in 2021 for about $2.1 billion, less than two times revenue. That is the parallel investors fear.
What makes Oura and Whoop different from Fitbit?
They sell premium, screenless devices that turn biometrics into recovery scores and illness warnings, backed by recurring subscriptions rather than one-time tracker sales. That is a stickier model, in theory.
Is now a good time to buy a wearable IPO?
That is your call, and this is not investment advice. The bears point to high marketing costs, a U.S. plateau IDC expects by 2028, and Garmin trading at half the multiple while turning a profit.
The Business Model Analyst Take
The wearable boom is real. The investment case is murkier. The strategic lesson for operators is sharp: slapping a subscription on top of hardware does not erase hardware economics. If your customer-acquisition cost stays high and your category has a ceiling, the recurring-revenue story only buys you time, not immunity. LeBron can afford a Whoop without blinking. Building a $11 billion business assumes everyone else will too, and that is the bet worth scrutinizing.
Source: The Wall Street Journal
